We study conditions relating to the impossibility of agreeing to disagree in models of interactive KD45 belief (in contrast to models of S5 knowledge, which are used in nearly all the agreements literature). We show that even when the truth axiom is not assumed it turns out that players will find it impossible to agree to disagree under fairly broad conditions.
Signal
States σ1 → {1, 2, 3} σ2 → {4, 5, 6} σ3 → {7, 8, 9} So far, so standard. Now consider the possibility of a mistake in signals processing on the part of Bob. Suppose that Bob inputs the signals he receives into a black box that he has been assured outputs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7, 8, 9 if the input is σ1,σ2, or σ3 respectively. Unbeknownst to Bob (and to Anne), however, Bob's black box is defective; when either σ1 or σ2 are given as input, the box outputs 4, 5, 6 (hence even if, e.g., the true state is 1 Bob thinks the true state is one of {4, 5, 6}.
States σ1 → {4, 5, 6} σ2 → {4, 5, 6} σ3 → {7, 8, 9} Consider next the event E = {4, 9}. This event will be interpreted as a 'good' outcome (e.g., company earnings are about to rise), with the complement representing a 'bad' event that ought to trigger the sale of shares. Suppose that the true state is 2, and that each one of the two traders behaves each day according to the following rule:
Buy if the probability of E is 0.3 or more; Sell if the probability of E is less than 0.3.
Given these assumptions, the following sequence of actions transpires. On Day 1, Anne, who processes signals correctly, supposes that the true state is one of 1, 2, 3, 4, judges the probability of E to be 1/4 and seeks to sell shares. Bob erroneously supposes that the true state is one of 4, 5, 6, judges the probability of E to be 1/3, and therefore buys shares from Anne.
Since Bob was willing to buy on Day 1, Anne 'learns' that the true state is not in 1, 2, 3. She therefore erroneously supposes on Day 2 that the true state is 4 and offers to buy on Day 2. Bob does the same. By Day 3, it is 'common knowledge' that 4 is the 'true state' -Bob's error has now become Anne's error. Both traders seek to buy as many shares as they can, to their detriment, and a bubble has developed.
[ Geanakoplos (1989) ] and [Morris (1996) ] show that in knowledge models that satisfy the truth axiom (but are not necessarily S5) more information is always beneficial for a player, in the sense that with more information a rational player will never choose an action that gives him less in expectation than an action that he chooses when he has less information. Without the truth axiom, that no longer holds true. Indeed, as the example here shows, without the truth axiom, not only is the 'mistaken' player in danger of choosing detrimental actions, his errors can cascade and 'infect' other players to their detriment: in Day 1 above, Anne makes the right decision in seeking to sell shares, but on Day 2, due to Bob's mistake, she is buying shares. Arguably, Anne has been mistaken all along, in accepting Bob's reports at face value, without considering the possibility that Bob might be mistaken.
The above story motivates the study of agreement and disagreement in models of belief as opposed to models of knowledge, which is the standard setting of most of the agreement literature.
PRELIMINARIES

Belief Structures
Fix a finite set of players I and a finite set of states of the world 2 denoted by Ω. Subsets of Ω are called events. The set of probability distributions over Ω is denoted by Δ(Ω).
A type function ti over Ω for player i is defined by assigning, for each ω, a probability distribution ti(ω) ∈ Δ(Ω) representing player i's beliefs at ω. We associate with each type function ti a partition Πi of Ω defined 3 by Πi(ω) = {ω | ti(ω ) = ti(ω)}. If we impose on a type function the property that ti(ω)(Πi(ω)) = 1, then the type functions is partitional. A probabilistic belief structure over Ω is then a set of partitional type functions (ti)i∈I over Ω.
A function bi : Ω → 2 Ω \ ∅ is a possibility function. The event bi(ω) is interpreted as the set of states that are consid-ered possible for i at ω, while all other states are excluded by i at ω. We will call a possibility function bi : Ω → 2 Ω \ {∅} that is measurable with respect to a partition Πi and satisfies bi(ω) ⊆ Πi(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω a KD45 possibility function.
A belief structure over Ω is a set of pairs Π = (Πi, bi)i∈I , where each bi is a KD45 possibility function with respect to the partition Πi of Ω. We will sometimes also call such a structure a KD45 belief structure.
The general structure of a model of KD45 belief of a player i is of an over-arching partition Πi, with each partition element π ∈ Πi furthermore partitioned into bi(ω) and fi(ω) (using an arbitrary ω ∈ π). Every element ω ∈ fi(ω) is mapped by bi into bi(ω), where it is 'trapped', in the sense that bi(bi(ω )) = bi(ω ) = bi(ω).
A probabilistic belief structure (ti)i∈I over Ω induces a belief structure (Πi, bi)i∈I over Ω, where Πi is the partition of Ω into the types of player i and bi(ω) is the set of states in Πi(ω) that have positive ti(ω) probability. Conversely, every belief structure over Ω is induced by a probabilistic belief structure over Ω. We will sometimes make use of this by choosing, for a given belief structure Π = (Πi, bi)i∈I , an arbitrary probabilistic belief structure (t b i )i∈I that induces Π.
Delusion
then bi is deluded at ω; in this case we will also sometimes say that ω is a deluded state for player i. This is where we are dropping the 'truth axiom': if one accepts the truth axiom there are never any deluded states for any player.
If there is at least one state at which bi is deluded, then bi is delusional, and we will similarly say that the corresponding belief operator Bi is delusional if this is the case. It is straight-forward to show that a belief structure Π is nondelusional for all players if and only if it is an S5 structure, and it is similarly straight-forward to show that a state ω is non-deluded for player i if and only if t b i (ω) = 0 for any probabilistic belief structure (t b i )i∈I that induces Π. Definition 1. A KD45 belief structure at which at all states ω ∈ Ω either a) every player i is deluded at ω or b) every player i is non-deluded at ω will be called a non-singular structure.
In examples, we will compactly express KD45 belief structures by separating states in different partition elements of Πi by the square boxes. Within each partition element we will denote states that are in the same component of bi(ω) by an oval box.
For example, if we write
then the intention is, for example, that 5, 6 and 7 are all in the same partition element, i.e., Πi(5) = {5, 6, 7}, but 5 is a delusional state such that bi(5) = {6, 7}.
BELIEF REVISION
The general approach we will follow is: in standard S5 concepts and formulae, replace Πi by bi and see what happens. We will apply this now to Bayesian belief revision.
Standard belief revision and priors
Let μ be a probability distribution over Ω, and let Πi be a partition of of Ω. The (standard) revision of μ at ω according to Πi is the probability distribution μ(ω) such that
if μ(Πi(ω)) > 0; otherwise it is undefined. We may interpret this as follows: ex ante the player has a prior probability distribution of full support. When updating following a signal, the player excludes states outside bi(ω), i.e. gives them zero probability. Since the player mistakes the reading of the signal, it is possible that he or she ends up giving the true state ω zero probability.
Let f be a random variable over Ω, μ be a probability distribution over Ω, and Πi a partition of Ω. Then the conditional expected value of f at ω is
Let (ti)i∈I be a probabilistic belief structure over Ω, with (Πi)i∈I the corresponding partition. A (standard) prior for ti is a probability distribution μ ∈ Δ(Ω), such that μ(ω) = ti(ω) at each ω, where μ(ω) is the standard revision of μ at ω according to Πi as defined in Equation (1). A (standard) common prior for (ti)i∈I is a probability distribution μ ∈ Δ(Ω) that is a prior for each ti.
Given a probabilistic belief structure (ti)i∈I with corresponding partition (Pi)i∈I , player i's posterior expected value of f at ω is
If there is a common prior μ, then for any random variable f the posterior expected value of each player equals the conditional expected value of f relative to μ and Πi, i.e., E
Delusional belief revision
Now replace Πi by bi in Equations (1) and (3). Let μ be a probability distribution over Ω, and let bi be a belief structure over Ω with corresponding partition Πi. We introduce here the delusional revision of μ at ω according to bi, defining it as the probability distribution μ(ω) such that
if μ(bi(ω)) > 0; otherwise it is undefined. Let f be a random variable over Ω, let μ be a probability distribution over Ω, and let bi be a belief structure over Ω with corresponding partition Πi. Then the delusional conditional expected value of f at ω according to bi is
if μ(Πi(ω)) = 0 (otherwise it is not defined). Let (ti)i∈I be a probabilistic belief structure over Ω, with (Πi)i∈I the corresponding partition. Let bi be the belief structure induced by ti. A delusional prior for ti is a probability distribution μ ∈ Δ(Ω), such that μ(ω) = ti(ω) at each ω, where μ(ω) is the delusional revision of μ at ω according to bi as defined in Equation (4). A common delusional prior for (ti)i∈I is a probability distribution μ ∈ Δ(Ω) that is a prior for each ti.
Let φi be a standard prior for ti, and suppose that for a state ω, ti(ω)(ω) = 0, and therefore that ω ∈ Πi(ω) but ω / ∈ bi(ω). Then by Equation (1) it must be the case that φi(ω) = 0. The same reasoning does not hold for a delusional prior; a standard prior is a delusional prior, but the converse is not necessarily true.
Example 1. Consider a one-player probabilistic belief structure over a state space Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3} defined by
for k ∈ {1, 2, 3}:
ω3 .
This induces a belief structure
with ω1 a deluded state, visualised as
The probability structure has only one (standard) prior, μ = (0, 1/2, 1/2), but it has an infinite number of delusional priors. The set of delusional priors includes, for example, (0, 1/2, 1/2) and (1/3, 1/3, 1/3).
Interpersonal Belief Credibility
S5 knowledge structures, by dint of satisfying the truth axiom, satisfy the property that i∈I bi(ω) = ∅ for all states ω ∈ Ω.
In KD45 belief structures there may be states at which
for all states ω we will say that the belief structure satisfies interpersonal belief credibility.
COMMON BELIEF
Denote b(ω) = i∈I bi(ω) and let b m be the composition of the function k repeated m times. Furthermore, define for each ω the common belief set b
S5 knowledge structures are naturally partitioned into common knowledge components. Let {Ω, (ki)i∈I )} be a knowledge structure. The meet is the finest common coarsening of the players' partitions. Each element of the meet of Π is called a common knowledge component of Π. Denote by C(ω) the common knowledge component of a state ω in a knowledge structure.
Let T ⊆ Ω be a common knowledge component. T can be characterised in several ways. One way is by knowledge chains. Defining k : Ω → 2 Ω by k(ω) := i∈I Πi(ω) and for m ≥ 0 letting k m be the composition of the function k repeated m times, it is well known that T = m≥1 k m (ω) for any ω ∈ T .
In addition, in S5 knowledge structures, a common knowledge component at ω can be characterised by the fact that
for all players i ∈ I
The corresponding statement in KD45 does not hold, i.e., it is not always the case that b Q (ω) = ω ∈Ω 0 bi(ω ) for some ω0 ⊆ Ω. When it does we will want to take note of this.
Definition 2. There is strong common belief in truth at a state ω if there exists Ω0 ⊆ Ω such that b
Proposition 1. There is strong common belief in truth at every state iff the belief structure is non-singular.
AGREEMENT IN BELIEF STRUCTURES
Standard No Betting
Definition 3. An n-tuple of random variables {f1, . . . , fn} is a bet if
Definition 4. Let (ti)i∈I be a probabilistic belief structure. Then a bet is an agreeable bet at ω (relative to (ti)) if E
A bet f is a common knowledge agreeable bet at ω if it is common knowledge at ω that f is an agreeable bet.
The main characterisation of the existence of common priors in S5 knowledge models in the literature is what is sometimes known as the No Betting Theorem: a finite type space has a common prior if and only if there does not exist a common knowledge agreeable bet at any ω. In the special case of a two-player probabilistic belief structure where the random variable is the characteristic function
where H is an event, this characterisation implies the seminal Aumann Agreement Theorem ([Aumann (1976)]), which states that if it is common knowledge at a state of the world that player 1 ascribes probability η1 to event H and player 2 ascribes probability η2 to the same event, then η1 = η2.
KD45 No Betting
Definition 5. Let (ti)i∈I be a probabilistic belief structure and (bi)i∈I a belief structure induced by (ti)i∈I . A bet f is a common belief agreeable bet at ω if it is common belief at ω that f is an agreeable bet.
With these definitions, we can now ask whether an analogue to the No Betting Theorem of S5 models holds in the KD45 setting. Given a probabilistic belief structure (ti)i∈I , does the existence of a common delusional prior imply that there is no common belief agreeable bet?
The answer to this question is no, as the following example 4 shows. 
ω3 .
This induces the belief structure (b1, b2)
and
For this belief structure, μ = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) is a common delusional prior. Let H = {ω1, ω2}. Then it is common belief at every state ω that E
To recapitulate something resembling the No Betting Theorem in belief structures, we add a new definition.
Definition 6. There is weak common belief in truth
5 at a state ω if there exists a state ω ∈ b Q (ω) at which there is strong common belief in truth.
An equivalent way of stating the content of Definition 6 is as follows: there is weak common belief in truth at ω iff there exists a state ω ∈ b Q (ω) such that
for all i, j ∈ I. This can be read intuitively as the players 'eventually' getting to strong common belief in truth as they follow chains in the common belief set. A belief structure version of the No Betting Theorem can be attained if we assume weak common belief in truth.
Theorem 1. Let (ti)i∈I be a probabilistic belief structure over Ω and let ω be a state at which there is weak common belief in truth. Then there is a common delusional prior if and only if there is no common belief agreeable bet at ω.
Since strong common belief in truth implies weak common belief in truth, and in a non-singular probabilistic belief structure there is strong common belief in truth at every state, Theorem 2 (which is close in content to a result appearing in [Bonanno and Nehring (1999) 
